The relationship between standards and intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a complementary but troubled one. The way it is managed affects the way stakeholders contribute to standards and may ultimately affect the way some technologies and even industries evolve. A spate of recent legal controversies has been accompanied by the emergence of new mechanisms to help govern the risk of conflict here. This article provides an empirical analysis of these attempts to reconcile the aims of these regimes.
Introduction
Formal committee-based standardization and intellectual property rights (IPRs)-patent regimes particularly-are economic institutions which date back to the beginning of modern economies. 1 The standards setting process relies to an increasing degree on successfully integrating up-to-date research and development results produced and owned by a larger and more heterogeneous groups of organizations. Technological solutions that might be "essential" to the development of relevant and successful standards in a given technological area are often covered by IPRs. The goal of elaborating timely and forward-looking standards has in this context meant finding ways to negotiate the rights covering technological solutions that are judged "essential" to a viable technological standard, especially in areas of complex technological systems such as that of the mobile technologies. An increasing challenge is how to make sure that licensing frameworks can effectively deal with the growing body of IPRs that may be essential to such standards. The way the growing set of standard setting organizations (SSOs) deal with patents in particular involves fundamental issues in the economics of technological change. Experience (and a growing literature) has clearly shown that there is an inherent balancing act that underlies the relationship between IPRs and formal standardization efforts. Farrell (1989) provides an early focus on this trade off, indicating the risk that stronger IPRs may unduly strengthen the position of an individual "vested interest" at the cost of delaying or undermining a socially beneficial outcome based on a common standard solution. The evolutionary tradition provides a more generalized notion of the division of labor. It relates patents most closely with an "invention motivation," where a primary role of the patent system is to contribute to the continuous generation of technical variety. 2 The role of SSOs can in turn be seen as most closely related to diffusion of technology, where they help select from the ripening variety of technological solutions and aim to promote the take up of new technologies. It is therefore important to the ongoing innovation process in industries where the potential for conflict is greatest that these institutions interact with each other in a timely and consistent way (Iversen, 2001; Blind and Iversen, 2004) . This material also indicates clearly that the potential for conflict to emerge between patent holders and the collective efforts to elaborate standards changed from a theoretical to a real possibility in the late 1980s as technologies became more complex and competitive pressures shifted (see the bellwether case of GSM, below). Weiss and Spring (1992) indicated that IPR issues could arise at different stages of the standardization process, and that "anticipatory" standardization (Cargill, 1989 ) could itself produce new technologies which would pose ownership questions. One byproduct of the change was the introduction of (F)RAND guidelines as a default means to define and minimize the risk of hold-up and to generally improve certainty in case a conflict arises. In the last decade, a rash of new conflicts has cropped up that is again challenging the balance (see below). This has again drawn into question how standardization deals with patents and how well the FRAND (fair reasonable and nondiscriminatory) framework functions in different contexts.
This article focuses on the changing role of FRAND in light of the emergence of other licensing frameworks to address the growing body of essential IPRs. The article enumerates the limitations that the tradition of FRAND IPR policy is currently facing and explores how the emerging problems can be mitigated-if at all-by three licensing mechanisms have recently been adapted to address the problem of essential patents: patent pools, nonassertion covenants (NACs), and voluntary ex ante licensing. The changing shape and role of these licensing mechanisms is important, because it can help reduce uncertainty and risk, and thereby affect the introduction of new technologies in the long-term. In this context, its aim is to point to this importance of an adaptable set of solutions in this area. The goal of this article is to provide an empirical basis that may help orient activities that are currently trying to improve the relationship between standardization and IPRs (see the current Federal Trade Commission report in the United States) 3 and current policy activities in Europe.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out in more detail how FRAND came into existence and discusses its current limitations. It also presents recent policy developments relating to IPR policies in SSOs, both in the United States and in Europe. Sections 3 to 5 each introduce one of the three new mechanisms, respectively. In these sections, we will also discuss the existing (mostly theoretical) literature. Section 6 investigates how these new mechanisms address the limitations we observe for FRAND. Section 7 reports empirical evidence of the application of the three mechanisms, before Section 8 finalizes the article with a discussion and a conclusion.
patents it does not otherwise have access to. Since the success of the standard depends on the availability of licenses for essential patents, it becomes important for SSOs to provide an efficient basis by which rights holders (usually among members) and potential implementers (among its members and more widely) can reach agreements on licensing terms, mindful that multiple essential patents and patent holders might be involved.
The need for specific guidelines to address essential patents is new. It effectively evolved as conflicts began to arise in recent decades. The earliest IPR conflicts to emerge out of formal standardization activities date from the late 1970s and early 1980s. 5 Since then, a rash of very different disagreements emerged that involved ATM cards, 6 56 kbp modems, and the so-called VESA Local Bus for computer graphic cards.
However, it was the controversy surrounding the comprehensive Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standards in the early 1990s that brought the conflict to a much higher and more international level. The GSM conflict made it clear that SSOs had to develop rules concerning IPR in the standards they draft in the changing technological and competitive environment. This amplified concerns that were already being addressed in the United States during the mid-1980s, when the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) began developing its patent policy. The way the newly created European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) addressed the IPR controversy in the GSM standards is widely seen as heralding a new era in which multi-party standardization activities would increasingly encounter IPR conflicts (Iversen, 1995 (Iversen, , 2001 Bekkers, 2001; Dupuis 2002; Haug 2002) . Based on the experience of GSM, ETSI adopted a new IPR policy in 1994 which is still largely in place and which has been the blueprint for IPR policies in many other SSOs around the world (Iversen, 2002) .
The way the conflict was addressed in ETSI's formative years helped to shape and test the FRAND principles. The policy is called FRAND, or (F)RAND, after the fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory conditions that licensors agree to use. In brief, the SSO commits to the position that IPR holders will be rewarded in a suitable and fair manner, member or not. Members are expected to make a reasonable effort to inform ETSI of relevant IPRs of which they are aware, especially if they propose a technical design. There is no obligation to search for potentially essential patents and members are expected to act "in good faith." The SSO will ascertain whether any holder of essential IPR is willing to make licenses available under fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, i.e. FRAND terms. If so, the declaration is added to the publicly available IPR database. If not, a subsequent set of formal steps may be taken. In short,
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The first relevant case appears to have involved a format for magnetically coding and storing information, Ansi's standard for Group Coded Recording (GCR There are many advantages to the FRAND guidelines. It is a one-size fits all solution to avoid conflicts. The rules are minimal. They are embedded in contract-law but build on good faith and the underlying interests of an IPR holder to get its technology into the standard. This basic set of ground rules has in most cases worked according to intentions, i.e. as a mechanism to ensure the interests of individual IPR holders line up with the overall objective of ensuring a successful standard. It is an attractive solution, since the guidelines provide considerable flexibility in which agreements can be reached. It effectively makes the court-system the instance of last resort rather than the first. Over time, FRAND has become familiar to players and other entities, including the courts. This has helped to establish the FRAND ground rules as a standard solution to the potential of IPR conflict.
Limitations of FRAND
However, a range of limitations has become apparent as it has become the dominant mode to address IPRs in standards. A recent series of legal actions that, in one way or another, involve difficulties with FRAND have helped highlight its shortcomings. These include a complaint lodged with the European Commission in 2005 by Nokia 7 The data was gathered from the FRAND declarations the SSOs publish in February 2010. As the published declarations usually include multiple patent family members, the data has been cleaned and duplicates removed. If there are several alternatives, it is hard to make an informed choice without knowing the costs. In financial and strategic terms, it can be very lucrative for a firm to own essential IPR in a successful standard. There is thus a risk that firms participate at these meetings in order to have their own technology included. There is also the possibility that companies allow other firms to push through (possibly unnecessary) patents if they are allowed to do the same thing as well. Bekkers et al. (2009) show that the patents of active participants in the standardization process stand a greater chance of becoming essential to the standard, regardless of the value of the patent in question. Including: lump sum, annual fee, volume-based fee, revenue-based fee, packages of essential and non-essential patents, cross-licensing, geographical constraints, time periods, grant back conditions. "one or more" essential IPRs which they neglect to specify. This does not reduce, but rather increases uncertainty.
2.1.4 How to make "cumulative licensing fees" reasonable There are more than fifty essential patent holders in some recent standards (Bekkers and West, 2009 ). This raises the risk that even if "reasonable" fees are sought by each IPR holder, the cumulative cost is likely to be prohibitively high. Thus, a major concern is how to deal with cumulative costs that emerge from multiple-rights and multiple rights-holders (c.f. Lemley, 2002 Lemley, , 2007 . Some authors (Lemley and Shapiro, 2006; Sidak, 2009) point to the dangers inherent in the cumulative license fee scenario, while Geradin et al. (2008) offer an opposing view. In general terms, "royalty stacking" can lead to co-ordination failure. This includes the risk of a "tragedy of the anti-commons" (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) in which rational individuals (acting separately) collectively waste a given resource by under-utilizing it.
15 FRAND, which is an agreement between the SSO and the individual member,
is not equipped to deal with this scenario and may even increase transaction costs.
2.1.5 How to deal with a blocking patent held by a third party FRAND rules also do not address blocking patents held by a third party. Third parties having not signed a FRAND agreement can use this position to "hold-up" the standardization process at a strategic time, i.e. after the industry is locked into using the standard. 16 This is especially risky in cases where the patentee is a "technology-only company" (see above) that is interested in maximizing licensing revenue and not in cross licensing in order to get a product to market. The number of this type of company has increased in recent years.
2.1.6 How to deal with patent rights that are transferred The risk posed by blocking third-party patents is complicated by another emerging situation: namely the increasing trade in patents, or transfer of rights. Patent exchanges and patent auctions especially are becoming more commonplace. They were not explicitly addressed, when FRAND policies were originally designed. One of the main questions is whether a licensing commitment would still be binding for subsequent owners of that patent. 
Patent pools
The patent pool is one of the alternative or complementary approaches that has received most attention both in theory as well as in practice. Following the USPTO, we define patent pools as " [. . .] an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties." (USPTO, 2000) . A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g. "one-stop shopping", rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually.
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The patent pool has a long and chequered history stretching back more than 100 years. More than 60 of such pools are reported in the early 20th century alone, mainly established in the United States (Merges, 2001; Lerner et al. 2003) . However, patent pools were more or less banned following World War II amid fears of monopolies and anti-competitive behavior. This anti-pool position was formalized in the 1970s, when the Department of Justice published its approach towards licensing, the so-called "nine no-no's". This was a list of per se violations of antitrust law, in other words: hardcore restrictions (Gordon, 2002) .
In 1995, the position was effectively reversed when the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued new guidelines for intellectual property that recognized the pro-competitive aspects of patent pools. This sparked a new set of 17 The use of so-called License of Right could be one way to go. Although it may introduce other problems.
US Patent and Trademark Office, "USPTO issues white paper on patent pooling", January 19, 2001. pools that were specifically designed to deal with technologies that were essential to one and the same technical standard. By bundling such patents, the access to the technologies needed to implement the standard would be facilitated, and thus these patent pools could have stronger pro-competitive than anti-competitive effects.
This has in turn sparked considerable-mainly theoretical-interest. Several authors show how patent pools may reduce patent thickets (Merges, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Brenner, 2009) . Several contributions indicate concerns that might emerge from patent pools. Lin (2002) argues that patent pooling has the potential to reduce the level of research and development in new technologies, which allows competition with an incumbent standard. Lerner and Tirole (2004) show that a pool is more likely to be welfare enhancing if patents are more complementary. Kobayashi and Wright (2010) offer an extensive overview of pro-and anticompetitive sides of pools and Junghon (2004) discusses pools from the perspectives of individual countries. Baron and Delcamp (2010) , in a patent analysis, find that firms that are already members of the pool are able to include lower quality patents than "newcomers". Some articles are more of an empirical nature; yet they usually focus their analysis on one single pool only. Examples are Blind (2003) discussing the pooling of MPEG patents, and Eltzroth (2009) who discusses the DVB pool.
Typical features of the modern patent pools are the following: (i) makes all pooled patents available to each member of the pool (ii) standard licensing terms to licensees who are not members of the pool; usually a simple, coherent menu of prices and other terms to licensees, (iii) allocates a portion of the licensing fees to each member according to a pre-set formula or procedure (iv) having an independent party to evaluate of the essentiality of the proposed patents and (v) consensus to license on FRAND considerations. The best known examples are the so-called MPEG-2 patent pool, and the two pools for the DVD standard, known as the DVD-3 and the DVD-6 pool.
Most, if not all of the modern patent pools bundle licensees for a specific technological standard. One reason for this is that the competition or antitrust authorities require pools to include complementary patents only (having substitute patents would be anticompetitive). Building a pool around the individual standard is a good way to define what is complementary and what is not. In fact, essential patents for a standard are by definition complementary, otherwise they could not have met the definition of being essential.
Initially, pools were mostly run by one of the largest companies involved in the initiative. This is usually called a "joint licensing programme." The DVD-3 pool is an example; Philips acts as the administrator and grants licenses on behalf of the other pool members. More recently, a new organization model emerged. In this new model, pools are established by specialist pool administrators, which may offer a wide collection of patent pools. These administrators use their experiences to establish and run pools. Firms involved in a standard can turn to such administrators with the request to set up a pool for their standard, but these administrators Patenting and technological standardization increasingly take the initiative for pools themselves, issuing calls for IPR that are essential for specific technical standards.
There are currently several such administrators including the major ones: MPEG Licensing Authority (MPEG LA), ViaLicensing, and Sisvel. 19 The activities and business models of these bodies seem broadly identical. The MPEGLA was originally established to administer MPEG-2 patents. ViaLicensing grew out of Dolby, a firm that has a long experience of licensing out its technologies to others (e.g. the Dolby noise reduction systems for tape recorders, and Dolby technologies for multi-channel cinema sound). Sisvel grew out of a joint-venture of Italian manufacturers of television sets. Table 2 presents an overview of recent, standard-based patent pools, including some pool proposals. All of the larger pool administrators have a number of new pools in formation. Most notably, all three are forming pools for LTE, the most promising fourth-generation mobile standard.
In the current context, where FR and FRAND policies show their limitations, patent pools hold some promise to help to (i) bring transaction costs down, 20 (ii) control the cumulative licensing costs, and (iii) clear blocking-patent positions and lessen access problems caused by opportunistic behavior. Other goals of patent pools include the avoidance of costly infringement litigation and assure the interoperability and implementation of technical systems. An often-overlooked aspect is the role of patent pools in that of a mechanism of information or knowledge exchange, e.g. information on the essentiality of IPRs.
Voluntary ex ante licensing
"Voluntary ex ante declaration of licensing terms" or "voluntary ex ante declaration of most restrictive licensing terms" basically invites parties to make statements about the maximum price they will charge for their IPR, before the decision is made to include that IPR in the standard. Here, we refer to the reduction of transaction costs associated with one-shot agreements in an environment with a repeat-play nature. Note that cross-licensing agreements can have this feature too: they often do include provisions of future IPR held by the contract parties. Based on an analysis of the number of US patents that are referred to by the patent administrator. Note that for some technologies that are specifically applied in Europe, there may not be a US patent at all.
c Number of patents depends on the product category. The given example is for "DVD Video Recorders: DVD-RW".
d
The firm LG joined at a later stage.
e Number of licensees for the US territory, for all CD, DVD, and DB-related technologies.
f Number of patents depends on the product category. The given example is for "DVD þ
positive Business Review Letter from the US Department of Justice, giving them the green light to use a voluntary ex ante licensing policy (Department of Justice, 2007) . Essentially, the policy provides patent holders with the option to publicly disclose and commit to the most restrictive licensing terms (which may include the maximum royalty rate) they would offer for patent claims that are found to be essential to the standard. In addition, IEEE working group members will be allowed to discuss within certain limits the relative costs and benefits of alternative technologies within technical standard-setting meetings.
In some respects, the voluntary licensing statements are not necessarily totally new. SSO members are also free to communicate ex ante what their licensing fees will in current SSOs applying the FRAND regime. In most settings, they can do so within the standardization context by referring to an external information source (such as an internet address). Still, there are three important advantages with this approach:
1. If firms choose to do ex ante licensing, this scheme ensures that the licensing conditions are signaled to all stakeholders, not a selective club. 2. Voluntary statements may also be used as input in the decision process on the inclusion of certain technologies in a standard, or the choice between alternatives. This may prevent the inclusion of technologies that later turn out to be more expensive than their contribution to the standard would justify. 3. The policy formalizes the process of ex ante declarations and also encourages firms to consider and use this option.
Voluntary ex ante licensing schemes can reduce uncertainty, which is a central problem. The outlook of low licensing costs seems to be one of the key explanations for the successful adoption of popular technologies such as the CD and VHS video recording (Grindley, 1995) . Voluntary ex ante licensing schemes also allow for a more conscious decision about technologies to be included in standard. If the added value (performance, cost-effectiveness) of different alternatives is known as well as the price of inclusion [the licensing fee that the IPR owner(s) will charge], then an informed choice can be made about what to include (see limitation I, above). This mechanism also creates competition between the alternatives (and their owners). Not only will this create an incentive for parties to compete on fees, it also reduces opportunities for holdup.
Multilateral NACs
Another approach that has emerged to address limitations with existing FRAND based-frameworks involves (multilateral) uses of NACs. A NAC is a generic form of agreement that has been tied to different licensing arrangements for some time. In brief, a NAC ensures the intention of the signatories not to assert a set of rights on one or more parties according to conditions spelled out in the agreement. It is a conditional waiver of rights which has been understood to be different than a nonexclusive license. 22 This type of agreement has been adapted to the standards environment where they have now become institutionalized in at least one SSOs IPR Policy (see below). This section provides a brief introduction of how NACs are being adapted to standardization processes. It points to several immediate advantages of this approach as well as some limitations. The adaptation of NACs from traditional license boilerplate to the areas of the standards environment can be traced through three basic steps. The first step involves a link with the open-source movement where new forms of licensing (e.g. GNU Free Documentation License and GNU Less General Public License or LGPL) have been developed and propagated to avoid conflicts with the growing number of software oriented patents starting in the 1990s. The Patent Commons Project launched by the Open Source Development Labs (OSDL) in 2005 can be considered a forerunner. It was based on a "vision" of pooling patents as an inexpensive and effective way to limit the risk of patent hold-up during software development. 23 The objective was to increase the freedom to operate, decrease administration and transaction costs, while still permitting royalty-based options in special cases. These aims are consistent with the objectives of producing and propagating successful standards, especially those involving software. The application of these principles to formal standardization can be traced to principles of the W3C's controversial RF licensing mode. 24 In addition, there have been several more specific precedents for adapting the NAC to standardization, including the early examples of patent pledges from Novell and, later, IBM. An important aspect of IBM's 2005 Statement of Non-Assertion 25 in this connection is that it was more than a conditional waiver of rights. It included a defensive clause that addressed the assertion of third party IPR not only against IBM itself but against any 22 Non-assertion covenants have been seen as distinct from licensing arrangements especially regarding the exhaustion of rights, although this interpretation may be changing. See Jung and Mollo (2009). 23 See http://xml.coverpages.org/ni2005-10-04-a.html#nonAssert: "Patent commons may be conceived as a pool of contributed patents serving to quarantine possibly harmful agents in a place where they can be monitored and do no harm, but which may also serve as a collective arsenal for (threat of) use against patent trolls and other entities seeking to lay a patent royalty-extraction tax burden upon the software development community.". 
26
SUN/ORACLE was a member of the OASIS Consortium, 27 a sponsor of the ODF standard, and a corporation widely assumed to hold IPR relevant to the standard. SUN/ORACLE issued a blanket waiver of its rights as far as they were essential to ODF. It did so in part to address concerns about how "open" the ODF standards would be. 28 The adaptation of NACs from the open-source space to this standardization environment was meant to dispel uncertainty among implementers of the standard about whether they would have to seek individual licenses from relevant patent holders. This NAC spells out the intentions of the issuer not to assert any patents that might be essential to the standard, without restriction: it pertains to any IPR which might be essential to the standard (without specifying the patent or the particular claim) in any jurisdiction; it pertained to the current version of the standard as well as any subsequent version the corporation was involved in elaborating; and it was irrevocable. The way it is framed allows the implementers of the standard to sub-license their implementation without seeking clearance (Berlind, 2005) . The agreement hinges again on reciprocity. Reciprocity is a feature that has been also included into the IPR policies of SSOs more recently. 29 In this case, the agreement would be annulled if other rights-holders assert their rights against those covered by the license. The reciprocity clause involved not only the issuer but could be extended to protect other implementers of the standard as well. It is a defensive clause. A Sun-based blog characterized this feature thus: "It's reciprocal (we won't sue you if you don't sue us). That means that we're still able to take action to protect ourselves and the community we participate in, despite providing rock-solid safety for developers and end-users. 30 In light of this, Microsoft launched a similar, but more specific NAC for the Open XML standards. A third step in the integration of NAC into standardization has been its introduction directly into the IPR policy of a standards body, the OASIS Consortium (introduced above), which includes representatives from major ICT companies with large IPR holdings. 31 The consortium's current IPR policy, which went into effect in August 2009, includes the formal option to use nonassertion type arrangements in the course of standardization. In its policy, the Oasis Consortium differentiates between a FRAND mode and RF modes, as do a number of other SSOs. There are different options for the license mode based on RF. In addition, OASIS has also included a separate mode that allows technical committees to form on the basis of a "Non-Assertion IPR Mode". 32 The affiliated organizations that are involved in a technical committee chartered in this mode will contribute to specifications in this mode according to a "Continuing Licensing or Non-Assertion Obligation". The benefit of this obligation extends to implementers of the standard for the "normative portion" of the standard for an indefinite period. The introduction of this mode into the working of a standards body provides a strong indication that NAC based arrangements serve a purpose not sufficiently covered by traditional (F)RAND conditions, at least for certain situations. It also indicates that the use of NAC in the context of the ODF and the Open XML standards (above) successfully lived up to the aims, namely to reduce uncertainty during the uptake of the standard and to reduce the costs of administering IP agreements. Moreover, the integration of a mode of standardization into the bylaws of a SSO is a further and stronger indication that the application of such agreements may have a wider application in the changing standardization landscape. The test will be how often and how well it works within OASIS, and whether it is taken up by other SSOs. The application will obviously be as supplement not as a replacement of current SSO policy.
Addressing the limitations of FRAND
On the basis of the discussion on the three mechanisms above, we now analyze to what extent these mechanisms have scope to address the limitations of FRAND regimes outlined in Section 2. The results are summarized in Table 3 . Patent pools are brought into place after the decisions on the standard's content have been made (ex post mechanisms). As a consequence, they do not affect limitation (I). For the patent pool's members, however, there is less uncertainty about the price and other licensing conditions, and fees in patent pools are generally expected to be lower. As such, limitations (II), (III), and (VI) are mitigated by the pool. Pools bring transactions costs down in a significant way, addressing limitation associated with (IV). Patent pools also provide valuable information about the essentiality of patents (scrutiny of the competition authorities forces them to ensure all patents in the pool are essential and valid indeed). As such, they address the problem of over-claiming and under-claiming. Patent pools may provide easy access to (blocking) patents of third parties, if these patent owners join the pool or agree to license with the pool (limitation V). If they do not however, the existence of a patent pool would itself not avert the possibility that a third party could block the standard.
Voluntary ex ante licensing schemes are rather different and can be characterized by the way they address the deficits of FRAND. Most importantly, they create a mechanism that addresses the technology inclusion process, allowing costs and benefits of inclusion to be assessed before a certain technology is ironed into the standard, thus addressing limitation (I). This is in fact one of the aspects emphasized by the US Department of Justice in their Business Review Letter (2007), which gave IEEE the green light to introduce this policy. Ex-ante licensing schemes also reduce the ambiguity of FRAND, as parties communicate at least the most restrictive conditions they will use. At the same time, they act to down the licensing fee (see above), by promoting competition between alternative technologies.
NACs are an ex ante mechanism that addresses some of the same concerns. It tackles uncertainty from the perspective of prospective adopters of the standard while reducing administrative costs during standards elaboration. First it dispels x: affects to a considerable degree; (x) affects to some degree.
Patenting and technological standardization uncertainty on the part of implementers and developers and other would-be users of the standard about the licensing status of the standard. This signaling effect can be important when large IPR holders are involved in elaborating the standard. It also signals to regulatory authorities who might be interested in the "openness" of a given standard (c.f. the ODF case). It provides a clear expectation of a standard unencumbered by IPR. There are no or very low transaction costs. The agreement reduces costs associated with designing and enforcing IPR-based license mechanisms. On the one hand, the agreement does not claim to search nor does it specify conditions for individual patents or claims for given time periods, but it obviates a need to analyze costs and benefits (I). On the other hand, implementers do not need to seek or obtain licenses (regardless of whether they are RF or not) in order to implement or further develop technology based on the standard. It is also a continuing agreement that builds on reciprocity, thus addressing concerns that licensing may change over time (II.) Furthermore, the reciprocity terms of some NACs may serve as a defensive function that extends beyond the issuer. The issuer may choose to assert its rights against a third party who asserts its rights not only against the issuer but even against those who implement the standard. This serves to align rights-holders who are proponents of the standard, both within the SSO and outside, and it reduces the potential for third parties to block the implementation of the standard (V).
The new coordination mechanisms in practice
In order to better understand how these mechanisms might work, we performed four case studies: three on patent pools, and one on a NAC. 33 We complement these results with the insights from 16 interviews with firms and industry experts, plus 10 additional interviews with regulators and SSOs. These interviews were conducted in the year 2010 and included a selection of interview partners from different industrial sectors, different home regions, different size, and different positioning in the value chain. This section discusses the current experiences with patent pools, NACs and voluntary ex ante licensing, respectively.
Current experiences with patent pools
Section 3 illustrated that the number and scope of patent pools currently in operation is increasing. The international pools are managed by three main pool administrators. Some have been particularly successful, having attracted nearly all the IPR holders for a given technology, and/or having attracted many implementing 33 An overview of these cases can be found in Annex 1, whereas detailed cases descriptions can be found in Bekkers et al. (2006). firms-sometimes over a thousand. However, there are at most a few dozen patent pools in existence while there are many thousands of standards in use.
The stakeholders we consulted clearly see the advantages of pool formation, and this is confirmed in our case study. Patent pools enable the process of finding reasonable aggregate licensing levels, while still providing good returns on investment for its licensors, and are thus helpful in situations where "patent stacking" may occur. The following aspects are mentioned as main advantages of pools:
Pools are fully compatible with FRAND, and thereby complementary. Pools reduce search costs and uncertainty. Pools allow for one-stop shopping and thus reduce transaction costs. Pools prevent double marginalization, while providing a truly reasonably royalty rate. Pools can help to increase market size, particularly in very fragmented markets where. Pools have good mechanisms to check for real essentiality, in order to comply with the conditions of competition/antitrust authorities. This reduces the risk of over-claiming. Pools are attractive for patent owners, whose normal business is not to collect royalties (such as universities).
These conditions tend to be found in the big, successful pools that cover technologies that are utilized in so many products that the implementation market is almost by definition very fragmented.
Disadvantages and issues that were mentioned concerning pools include the following:
Pool formation is a difficult process and requires a lot of resources. That is why pools make most sense when the expected market size is large enough. Small pools do not make sense, the costs are too high. Pools make sense in fragmented markets, with have a lot of licensors and/or a lot of licensees. Pools that cover only a fraction of the actual IPR for a standard are not very useful. It is essential that the large licensees sign up. Examples of pools that have little impact are the 3G Licensing pool (which excludes the four largest IPR owners for 3G) and the 802.11 pool by ViaLicensing. In patent pools, it is usual that the royalties are divided on the basis of the number of essential patents per patent owner. However, if some patent owners have strongly "padded" portfolios, this can be problematic. Patent holders can lose substantial control over their patents when joining a pool. Pools may hamper competition, although government agencies generally see the pro-competitive effects outweighing adverse effects of standards-related pools.
Finally, it was argued that many important decisions (royalty algorithms, licensing terms, enforcement of licensing agreements, who may license, and administrative fees) are subject to votes of all pool members. The group may wish to take actions that a member disagrees with or considers risky, but the member may have difficulties extricating itself. It was argued that the major players often believe they can leverage their bargaining power much better in bilateral licensing negotiations. They have better opportunities (e.g. better rewards) outside the pool. Other interviewees noted though, that in some other pools, it is the smaller IPR owner that choses to stay out of the pool, hoping to generate a bigger income from their patents (this was argued for the MPEG-2 pool). Larger manufacturers emphasize the primary importance of getting the product to market. A major attraction for these actors, who derive only a small part of their revenue from licensing streams, is that patent pools help streamline their licensing arrangements.
All in all, we observe that pools work well in areas with (i) fragmented implementation markets, (ii) relative homogenous expectations, views and business models among IPR holders and (iii) markets where the mere existence of the pool is likely to increase the market size. Such conditions are met, for instance, by the pools for audio and video coding technologies, and for DVD standards. Pools are less likely to be successful in more complex technologies such as complete mobile telecommunications standards. There are more owners, more business models, and there are so many patents making it a time-consuming process to determine the essentiality of all these patents.
In general, our case work suggests that patent pools can aid the diffusion of standards. In given situations, they can be used to promote a standard or a technology, which might lead to a substantially larger market and which might be more likely to succeed. The higher penetration (larger market) may offset the typically lower income per license of pools compared to bilateral licensing. When such a promotion of a technology is the key objective of the parties involved, this trade-off is acceptable and a patent pool makes sense. As such, they can indirectly improve the interface between standards and research, as the more likely standards are going to be, the higher the incentive to bring research results into them. Also, with the outlook of a pool (and thus better accessibility of the IPR of others), it makes it easier for a firm to bring patented research results into a standard.
However, patent pools do not eliminate all problems. The two patent pool cases discussed above indicate that particularly the most crucial problem of conflict of interest 34 is not likely to be addressed successfully by pools. Also the problem of controlling the cumulative license fee is not likely to be solved by establishing pools. Although pools may have the effect of bring down these fees, this is only to the degree that the pools at the same time increase the total market size (by the promoting function of the pool). Furthermore, patent pools may increase royalties by eliminating competition among licensors in cases where patents represent substitute technologies (Gilbert, 2004; Lemley, 2007) . Pools that are established with the main goal of bringing down the cumulative fee (e.g. using price caps) are likely to fail, as long as the total market is not expected to grow substantially as a result of the creating of the pool. Finally, pools also do not seem able to cope with the question of unwilling IPR holders, patent ambushing, submarine patenting strategies, patent trolls, etc. The nonalignment of pool member interests can also lead to bargaining failure, and there is also the additional risk of free-riding (Aoki and Nagaoka, 2004: Krattiger et al., 2007) . All relevant patents may not be included in the pool. The situation is somewhat different in the NAC case as presented. Here a major IPR holder in effect seems to take on the role of a "patent policeman" to make sure that all parties, both those involved in the standards activities and third parties, will not enforce their patents for the purposes of the standard. In addition, patent pools may have anti-competitive implications and will depend on some sort of regulatory clearance. The recent publication of "most restrictive fees" by a number of large patent owners for LTE, for instance, does not match with the concept of ex ante licensing presented here, because this information was supplied long after the technologies in question were incorporated in the standard. The view of interviewees on ex ante licensing declarations was rather mixed. Some pointed out that these schemes do exist and that they do work. It was argued that this mechanism specifically fits ex post types of standards processes, where a choice is made between fully fledged alternatives (e.g. complete systems, or relatively independent modules such as speech, audio, or video coders). However, others focused on ex ante standards processes (not to be confused with ex ante licensing!). These are better characterized as a development process where standards and technologies are actually created as a part of the standardization process. Technology inclusion is a very incremental process and there are few or no moments where fully fledged alternatives can be compared. It is exactly these ex ante standards processes (like in telecommunications) where we observe the largest number of patents in standards and where the limitations of FRAND are most felt. Patenting and technological standardization In addition, several interviewees argued that they would definitely not chose to make such voluntary statements because one does not know in advance how the market will develop (market volume, unit cost, process, etc.) , and neither does one know what other parties demand for their IPR. It is also not known, what the resulting standard will look like and how many other technologies and patents will be covered by the standard. They argue that if parties are willing to make statements, they will stay on the safe side and seek relatively high levels of compensation. The sum of all these compensations results in an unreasonable amount. So the whole exercise results in noninformation. It was added that "price is only one dimension and does not express all relevant aspects of licensing conditions". Having said this, it should be noted that not all interviewees agreed on the above point, and even some firms operating in the telecommunications area that did believe in ex ante licensing, even in their own area.
Current experiences with ex ante voluntary licensing
Since 2006, ETSI explicitly allows companies to make ex ante declarations on a voluntary basis. In the ETSI IPR group there have been intense discussions on the issue, the final outcome being that a company can include in its IPR declaration a reference to a website that explains its ex ante declarations. However, ETSI's experience with ex ante licensing can be described as not very positive: there is to date not a single declaration received by ETSI (compared to almost 30,000 FRAND declarations). Also in other bodies, the option to make such voluntary statements seems to be rarely used. Moreover, interviewees also reported negative experiences within VITA Standards Organization (VSO), arguing that the adoption of a mandatory ex ante disclosure made the main players leave this SSO. The practice seems to prove the critics right.
Current experiences with NACs
The unilateral use of NACs illustrates the fact that new mechanisms are being tried in order to resolve the sorts of problems that can arise when a standard involves the IP of an unknown number of patent holders. These moves are attempting to return the relationship between standards and patents to a time when patents were employed defensively (see for an overview of strategic patenting motives Blind et al. 2006) . This approach appeals to users in the public sector, and emphasizes the importance of support. Moreover, the advantages of a standard that is widely adopted outweigh the added prospect of royalty income. The NAC case attempts to circumvent this tangle of issues by using the IPR position of a dominant player to ensure the standard will remain RF. But this is a special case and one where the market structure, the legislative climate, and the type of technology all influence the outcome.
The NAC case is one in which the SSO and the strategic use of the NAC are strongly aligned. Here, the legal bond of the member companies to the SSOs provides some of the credibility of its commitment not to enforce its IPR. At the same time, the existence of this NAC helps the SSO to bill the standard as RF. This does not protect against the "IP" only company (see also below) because there is no countervailing pressure of enforcement for those actors. One of the concerns of SSOs involves the timely disclosure of essential IPR. Here the successful NAC actually moves a significant step beyond merely getting the holders of "essential" IPRs to disclose in a timely fashion. Disclosure is a primary step to address the threat that IPR royalties pose to the development of a standard, and it has been addressed both in the courts since at least the early 1980s 35 and since then by SSOs. The NAC is the initiative of one IP holder who unilaterally acknowledges that it has rights which might be viewed as essential for the standard at hand; and it, as a matter of public record, states its intention not to claim royalties for those rights provided reciprocity from other rights-holders. Of course this action by a single actor does not mean that all rights will be disclosed by all other rights-holders or that they will follow suit in licensing terms. But it does force the hand of recalcitrant rights-holders and it ideally can set a model for the way other all rights-holders behave for the purposes of the given standard. Failing that, playing the NAC card may be advantageous since it would tend to flush out any royalty-bearing rights at a relatively early stage.
There are limitations associated with NACs. First, they do not seem suitable to all situations. They appear best adapted to certain software-oriented standardization cases, especially those involving lead supporters of standards with large patent portfolios. They may also have legal limitations. Their application seems also to be mostly adapted to the US legal system and the application of NACs to standards setting has not been tested in court. Furthermore, the 2009 US ruling (TransCore, LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp, see above) questions the scope of NACs. Still, the integration of NAC into the IPR policy of a single SSO does provide further evidence that new mechanisms are being developed to improve on the current and recognized problems with FRAND.
Concluding discussion
This article identified current limitations of FRAND policies, and explored how and under which conditions these problems might be mitigated-if at all-by patent pools, voluntary ex ante licensing, and NACs. The article summarizes the limitations of FRAND in terms of seven main sets of challenges: (i) How to judge costs versus benefits of including patents; (ii) How to define what FRAND means in practice; (iii) How to promote accurate disclosure of "essential" IPR; (iv) How to make "cumulative licensing fees" reasonable; (v) How to deal with a blocking patent held by a third party; (vi) How to deal with patent rights that are transferred. In addition, there are other more context-related concerns, for example that in certain cases that FRAND may involve relatively higher transaction costs or that, under FRAND, patent holders might subsequently seek higher licensing fees.
These are considerable challenges and their effects are felt by almost any player in the value chain-although the impact of the effect differs strongly for different categories of players. This can affect the way IPR and standardization interact, and affect the standardization process. The article went on to identify the emergence of licensing mechanisms that are emerging and being applied to this context. We analyze the applicability of these mechanisms to address the shortcomings of the dominant FRAND approach. This fills a significant hole in the literature which has tended to focus on individual aspects of FRAND or on one of the licensing mechanisms, particularly patent pools.
A set of case-studies and a round of interviews with relevant stakeholders are used to address the potential of these emerging licensing mechanisms in this light. The analysis demonstrates that there is no single solution that can address all limitations of FRAND in all contexts. Moreover, the success of the different mechanisms depends greatly on the willingness of stakeholders (mostly IPR owners) to embrace them. Important players may decide to turn their backs to an SSO that adopts policies that they do not support. It is thus not only the theoretical potential of emerging licensing to solve the limitations of FRAND, but the ability to attract stakeholder support that will decide whether these new mechanisms will prove successful. In particular:
For patent pools, we conclude that there is support in situations in which there are fragmented implementation markets, where there are relative homogenous expectations, views and business models among IPR holders, and where the mere existence of the pool is likely to increase the market size. This is exactly what characterizes the current, successful pools. Pooling efforts in markets where these conditions have not been met usually meet little success. The applicability of voluntary, ex ante licensing, depends very much on support from stakeholders. In general, firms operating in the telecommunications area have little faith in this mechanism and argue that for their complex, integrative standards, this mechanism will not work as it is not possible to choose between fully fledged alternatives. It is exactly the telecommunications fields, however, where we find the largest numbers of patents in standards. In other fields, such as audio and video codex, there is more potential support for voluntary, ex ante licensing to work as this is an area where there are choices between existing alternatives. Finally, for NACs support also strongly depends on the sector. This strategy has grown out of the software industry. It is in the context of software oriented standardization that it has its greatest application both due to business models and the type of technology. It is not suited to telecommunications firms or to consumer electronics industry, where large patent portfolios combine with R&D intensive hardware. So, even though there are some clear limitations of FRAND, many existing players are reluctant to support alternative mechanisms. Despite its limitations, FRAND is familiar to the players and other entities, including the courts. It is not perfect, but stakeholders know what to expect. If the current trends of increasing numbers of patents and patent owners in standards continue, then the limitations of FRAND (such as transaction costs) will be more strongly felt and support for the presented and other new mechanisms might grow.
What are the consequences for policy makers? On the one hand, the new mechanisms are promising and policy makers should consider whether and how they might support and promote them, assuming that sufficient safeguards are included to prevent anti-competitive behavior. The market can learn from experimenting with new mechanisms, finding pathways to better balances between the various types of stakeholders. In proceeding, policy makers are recommended to clarify their support and the specific conditions under which such mechanisms may be allowed from the competition policy or antitrust perspective. The Business Review Letters issued by the US Department of Justice to various patent pools and towards the ex ante licensing in IEEE are steps in the right direction, and a similar degree of openness in Europe would improve transparency. They are also advised to cooperate with stakeholders (both firms and SSOs) to see whether they can encourage and induce them to get them (increasingly) involved in voluntary schemes. However, it seems unlikely that companies can be successfully forced into such schemes, and the risk that industry moves its standards efforts to another jurisdiction is not negligible.
Also SSOs are advised to think more openly about IPRs in standards and to experiment with mechanisms such as voluntary ex ante licensing. While they can help to mitigate problems, they have few costs, and their voluntary nature ensures that parties who do not want to engage in them (for instance because they believe it to be incompatible with their business methods), are free not to do so. In a more critical way, we would also advise them to think more deeply about the technology inclusions process. In quite a few areas, the number of patents involved in standards is very high, and one could ask the question how necessary the inclusion of all these technologies actually is. Recent studies, such as that of Bekkers et al. (2011) have shown that there is a significant positive relationship between patent value and this patent being claimed as essential to a standard, and that there is a significant relationship between participating in the process and getting an essential patentregardless of the patent's quality. A more continuous process, where the inclusion of patented technologies is based on a deliberate analysis of the benefits of that technology (in terms of performance, cost reduction of equipment, etc.) versus the costs of inclusion (e.g. anticipated license fees) would be beneficial, e. g. via voluntary ex ante licensing. 
